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We introduce new quantum key distribution protocols us-
ing quantum continuous variables, that are secure against in-
dividual attacks for any transmission of the optical line be-
tween Alice and Bob. In particular, it is not required that
this transmission is larger than 50 %. Though squeezing or
entanglement may be helpful, they are not required, and there
is no need for quantum memories or entanglement purifica-
tion. These protocols can thus be implemented using coherent
states and homodyne detection, and they may be more effi-
cient than usual protocols using quantum discrete variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Coherent QKD protocols
In the presently very active field of continuous variable
quantum information processing, a stimulating question
is whether quantum continuous variables (QCV) may
provide a valid alternative to the usual “single photon”
quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes. Many recent
proposals to use QCV for QKD (for a short review see
[1]) are based upon the use of “non-classical” light beams,
such as squeezed light, or entangled pairs of light beams.
We have shown recently [1] that there is actually no need
for squeezed light : an equivalent level of security may be
obtained by simply generating and transmitting random
distributions of coherent states. More precisely, we have
shown in [1] that a whole family of secure protocols can be
obtained by using either coherent states, squeezed states,
or entangled EPR beams, provided that the transmission
of the line is larger than 50% (i.e. the losses are less than
3 dB). The security of these protocols is related to the
no-cloning theorem [2,3], and non-classical features like
squeezing or EPR correlations have no influence on the
achievable secret key rate. The 3dB loss limit of these
cryptography protocols makes their security demonstra-
tion quite intuitive, but there exist in principle multiples
ways for Alice and Bob to go beyond this limit, using e.g.
entanglement purification [4].
In this paper we present new protocols that are secure
for any value of the line transmission. The basic idea is
to use reverse reconciliation protocols, that is, Alice will
try to guess what was received by Bob, rather than Bob
trying to guess what was sent by Alice. In that case, Alice
can always guess better than the eavesdropper Eve: this
is the basic reason for the security of these new protocols.
B. Direct and reverse reconciliation protocols
In the first step of a generic QKD protocol, Alice pre-
pares a quantum state and sends it to Bob, who makes a
measurement on this state. Alternatively, Alice and Bob
may share two EPR-correlated systems, and they both
make measurement on their parts. In order to warrant
security, Alice and Bob must randomly choose to use dif-
ferent measurement basis, and the transmitted data will
be significant only when their basis are compatible. Af-
ter the quantum exchange, they have thus to agree on a
common measurement basis, and discard the wrong mea-
surements. At the end of this step, Alice and Bob (and
the potential eavesdropper Eve) know a set of correlated
measurements, that we will call the “key elements”.
As a second step, Alice reveals some randomly cho-
sen samples of the data that she sent, and Bob reveals
his corresponding measurements. These samples allow
them to measure some relevant parameters of the quan-
tum channel, e.g. the error rate and the transmission,
that is called “channel gain” for QCV protocols. Know-
ing the correlations between their key elements, Alice
and Bob can evaluate the amount of information they
share (IAB), and the information the eavesdropper Eve
can have about their values (IAE and IBE). Therefore
they can evaluate the size of the secret key they will gen-
erate at the end of the protocol. If Eve knows too much,
the size of this secret key will be 0, and Alice and Bob
will abort the protocol at this step.
Now comes the crucial step of reconciliation, where Al-
ice and Bob will use classical communications to extract a
common key from their correlated key elements, revealing
as little information as possible to a third party ignoring
these key elements. This step usually uses parity-based
algorithms like Cascade. There are actually two main
options for doing the reconciliation [5]:
Direct Reconciliation (DR). Alice sends correction in-
formation and Bob corrects his key elements to have the
same values as Alice. Alice knows from the previous step
the minimum amount of information she’s got to reveal
at this step. If the reconciliation protocol is perfect, it
keeps IAB − IAE constant. At the end of this step, Alice
and Bob know a common bit string of length IAB , and
Eve knows IAE bits of this string (slightly more if the
reconciliation protocol is not perfect). It will provide a
useable secret key if IAB − IAE > 0 at the beginning.
We call this “direct reconciliation” (DR) because Bob is
reconstructing what was sent by Alice, and the classical
information flow at this step has the same direction as
the initial quantum information flow.
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Direct reconciliation is quite intuitive, and it was used
in the coherent state QCV protocol that we proposed
recently [1]. However, it is not secure as soon as the
quantum channel efficiency falls below 50%. Intuitively,
Eve could simulate the losses by a beam splitter and look
one output port of this beamsplitter. It seems obvious
that, if she keeps the biggest part of the beam sent by
Alice (i.e. if she simulate losses higher than 50%), she
can extract more information from this beam than Bob
(IAE > IAB), thus forbidding any secret key generation.
This limitation is actually not specific to QCV : a “di-
rect” version of BB84 would be a protocol where Bob
would try to fill the “empty slots” where he did not get
any photon. It’s straightforward to show that this pro-
tocol only works when the losses are smaller than 3 dB.
Reverse Reconciliation (RR). We will thus consider
“reverse” reconciliation (RR) protocols, where Bob sends
correction information and Alice corrects her key ele-
ments to have the same values as Bob. Since Bob gives
the correction information (also to Eve), this type of rec-
onciliation keeps IAB − IBE constant, and will provide a
useable key if IAB − IBE > 0. We call it “reverse recon-
ciliation” (RR) because Alice adapts herself to what was
received by Bob.
In a noiseless BB84 with finite line transmission, this
step corresponds to Bob giving to Alice his “empty slots”
where he did not get any photon, and Alice removing the
bits she sent at these slots to have the same key. Obvi-
ously it is also possible to make a reconciliation protocol
using two way communications, but it can be shown [6]
that reverse reconciliation is optimum for a coherent state
protocol when there is no excess noise in the transmission
line (see below). Therefore two-ways protocols will not
be considered further in the present paper.
Finally, the last step of a practical QKD protocol is
that Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification to filter
out Eve’s information. Since this step is based on an
evaluation of the amount of information collected by Eve
on the reconciled key, a crucial requirement is to get a
bound on IAE for DR, and on IBE for RR. For a coherent
state protocol, the DR bound was given in ref. [1], and
leads to a security limit for a 50% line transmission as
said above. We will now establish the RR bound, and we
will show that it is not associated with a minimum value
of the line transmission.
II. ENTANGLING CLONER
A. Definition
To eavesdrop a reverse reconciliation scheme, as de-
scribed above, Eve needs to guess the results of Bob’s
measurement. We will call entangling cloner a system
allowing her to do so, because this kind of system can be
described a cloner creating two quantum-correlated out-
put: Eve keeps one of them and sends the other to Bob.
Let (xin, pin) be the input quadratures of the entangling
cloner and (xB , pB), (xE , pE) the quadratures of its two
outputs. A good entangling cloner should minimize the
conditionnal variances [7] VxB |xE and VpB |pE .
Alice and Bob should assume Eve uses the best possible
entangling cloner, knowing the Alice-Bob channel quality.
This channel can be described by
xB = gx(xin +Bx) (1)
pB = gp(pin +Bp), (2)
with (N0 is the shot noise variance)〈
x2in
〉
=
〈
p2in
〉 ≡ V N0 ≥ N0 (3)〈
B2x,p
〉 ≡ χx,p N0 (4)
〈xinBx〉 = 〈pinBp〉 = 0 (5)
B. Heisenberg inequalities on Alice and Eve’s
conditional variances
For reverse reconciliation protocols, Alice needs to
evaluate xB. Her estimator can be noted αxA, with
α ∈ R . Eve’s estimator for pB will be εpE . Their error
will be
xB|A,α ≡ xB − αxA (6)
pB|E,ε ≡ pB − εpE. (7)
The commutator [xB|A,α, pB|E,ε] of these two quanti-
ties is then equal to
[xB , pB]− α [xA, pB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−ε [xB, pE ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+αε [xA, pE]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
. (8)
We have therefore
[xB|A,α, pB|E,ε] = [xB, pB] (9)〈
x2B|A,α
〉〈
p2B|E,ε
〉
≥ N20 (10)
The conditional variances obey by definition the following
relations :
VxB |xA = minα
{〈
x2B|A,α
〉}
(11)
VpB |pE = min
ε
{〈
p2B|E,ε
〉}
(12)
and equation (10) leads to
VxB |xAVpB |pE ≥ N20 , i.e. VpB |pE ≥
N20
VxB |xA
. (13)
By exchanging the roles of x and p one obtains similarly
VpB |pAVxB |xE ≥ N20 , i.e. VxB |xE ≥
N20
VpB |pA
. (14)
These inequalities mean that Alice and Eve cannot
jointly know more about Bob’s field than allowed by the
Heisenberg principle.
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C. Alice’s conditional variance
If Alice creates the field (xin, pin), we can write
xin = xA + Ax (15)
pin = pA +Ap (16)
where xA (pA)is Alice’s best estimation of xin (pin) and
〈
A2x
〉
=
〈
A2p
〉 ≡ sN0 (17)
where s is the amount of squeezing used by Alice to gen-
erate this field. We have then
s ≥ 1
V
. (18)
The correlation coefficients are equal to
〈
p2A
〉
= (V − s)N0 (19)〈
p2B
〉
= Gp(V + χp)N0 (20)
〈pApB〉 = gp
〈
p2A
〉
, (21)
and allow us to calculate Alice’s conditional variance on
Bob’s measurement :
VpB |pA =
〈
p2B
〉− 〈pApB〉
2
〈p2A〉
= GpV N0 +GpχpN0
−GpV N0 +GpsN0
= Gp(χp + s)N0 (22)
A similar calculation leads to the symmetric relation
VxB |xA = Gx(χx + s)N0 (23)
These equations and the constraint (18) on the squeezing
give finally
VpB |pA ≥ VpB |pA,min = Gp(χp +
1
V
)N0 (24)
VxB |xA ≥ VxB |xA,min = Gx(χx +
1
V
)N0 (25)
D. Eve’s conditional variance
The output-output correlations of an entangling
cloner, described e.g. by VpB |pE , should only depend on
the density matrix of the field (xin, pin) at its input, and
not on the way this field was built. The inequality (13)
has thus to be fulfilled for every physically allowed value
of VxB |xA , given the density matrix of the field (xin, pin).
If we look for a boundary to Eve’s knowledge by using
eq.(13), we we have thus to use the tightest limit on
VxB |xA , that is given by VxB |xA,min according to (25).
Obviously the same reasoning holds for VpB |pA , with the
corresponding tightest limit VpB |pA,min.
We have then
VxB |xE ≥ VxB |xE,min =
N0
Gp(χp + 1/V )
(26)
and, similarly
VpB |pE ≥ VpB |pE ,min =
N0
Gx(χx + 1/V )
(27)
E. Implementation
In a practical QKD scheme Alice and Bob will give
the same roles to x and p. Assuming therefore that Gx =
Gp = G and χx = χp = χ, the two bounds (26, 27) reduce
to a single one, and it is possible to explicitly describe an
entangling cloner achieving this limit. We will consider
here only the case where G < 1, but the limit is tight
for any G. The entangling cloner can then be sketched
as follows : Eve uses a beamsplitter with a transmission
G to split up part of the Alice-Bob transmitted signal,
and she injects into the other input port a field E1, with
the right variance to induce a noise of variance GχN0 at
Bob’s end. One has therefore:
〈
x2E1
〉
=
GχN0
1 −G
〈
p2E1
〉
=
GχN0
1−G (28)
Eve should know the maximum about this injected field
E1, and will therefore use an half-pair of EPR-correlated
beams, so that she does perform an “entangling” attack.
We can then write
xE1 = xknown + xunknown (29)
where xknown stand for Eve’s best estimation of xE1,
given by the measure of its brother-beam, and xunknown
stand for the noise she cannot know. We have
〈
x2unknown
〉
=
N20
〈x2E1〉
=
(1−G)N0
Gχ
(30)
〈
x2known
〉
=
〈
x2E1
〉− 〈x2unknown
〉
(31)
Eve also use an output port of the beamsplitter to
measure the field E2, which gives her information about
the input field :
xE2 = gxE1 −
√
1−Gxin. (32)
She can cancel a part of the noise induced by E1 by
substracting the part proportional to xknown. Thus she
knows
x′E2 = gxunknown −
√
1−Gxin. (33)
We also have
xB = gxin +
√
1−GxE1. (34)
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where Eve already knows the part proportional to xknown,
injected with xE1 and she only needs to guess
x′B = gxin +
√
1−Gxunknown (35)
from x′E2. We have therefore
VxB |xE1,xE2 = Vx′B |x
′
E2
. (36)
The calculation of the quantities
〈
x′2B
〉
,
〈
x′2E2
〉
, 〈x′E2x′B〉
lead straightforwardly to the conditional variance :
Vx′
B
|x′
E2
=
N0
Gχ+G/V
= VxB |xE,min (37)
showing that the entangling cloner does reach the lower
limit of (26, 27).
III. REVERSE CRYPTOGRAPHY
A. Tolerable noise
In a reverse quantum cryptography protocol, Eve’s
power is limited by the values of VxB |xE ,min and
VpB |pE ,min given by (26, 27). In the following, we will
assume that a “perfect” Eve is able to reach that limit:
VxB |xE = VxB |xE,min =
N0
Gp(χp + 1/V )
(38)
VpB |pE = VpB |pE ,min =
N0
Gx(χx + 1/V )
(39)
Reverse cryptography is possible when
VxB |xE > VxB |xA (40)
or VpB |pE > VpB |pA (41)
Combining equations (22, 23) and (39), the above condi-
tions become
(Gxχx +Gxs)(Gpχp +
Gp
V
) < 1 (42)
(Gpχp +Gps)(Gxχx +
Gx
V
) < 1. (43)
These inequalities give the general conditions for the se-
curity of a reverse reconciliation protocol. For simplicity
reasons, we will assume in the following everything is
symmetric in (x, p), i.e. Gx = Gp = G and χx = χp = χ,
so that these conditions simplify into:
(Gχ+Gs)(Gχ+G/V ) < 1. (44)
Any experimental implementation of this protocol should
however estimate these parameters from statistical tests,
which are likely not to be exactly symmetric.
B. Secret information rates
The conditions (44) can directly be translated into an
information rate by using Shannon’s formula:
IBA =
1
2
log2
〈
x2B
〉
VB|A
(45)
IBE =
1
2
log2
〈
x2B
〉
VB|E
(46)
The secret information rate, for a reverse reconciliation
protocol is therefore
∆I = IBA − IBE = 1
2
log2
VB|E
VB|A
(47)
∆I =
1
2
log2
1(
Gχ+ G
V
)
(Gχ+Gs)
(48)
C. High-modulation limit
At the high modulation limit, V → ∞, and for any
squeezing s the condition (44) becomes
Gχ(Gχ+Gs) < 1 (49)
(Gχ)2 +Gs(Gχ)− 1 < 0 (50)
∆ = G2s2 + 4 (51)
We have therefore
Gχ <
1
2
(√
G2s2 + 4−Gs
)
(52)
The inequality (52) gives the maximum tolerable added
noise for a reverse protocol to be secure. The correspond-
ing limit is less stringent for low s values, i.e. for strong
squeezing. The more squeezing Alice uses, the more noise
reverse cryptography can tolerate.
Let us consider the case of a lossy transmission line
with G ≤ 1. The added noise is always bigger than a
minimal value, Gχ ≥ (1 −G), this inequality being sat-
urated if there is no excess noise (in that case the only
added noise is vacuum noise). In that case where the
noise is only due to losses, (52) becomes
1−G < 1
2
(√
G2s2 + 4−Gs
)
(53)
It is straightforward to check that this inequality holds
for arbitrary high losses (G→ 0), even for coherent states
(s = 1). Therefore reverse reconciliation provides a sim-
ple way to extend the coherent state protocols of ref. [1]
into the high-loss regime.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this section we consider protocols with the same
quantum communication part as in ref. [1], but we as-
sume that reverse reconciliation is used. The main ad-
vantage is that the 3dB loss limit for security goes away
as explained above. Here we give more quantitative esti-
mates of the security thresholds.
A. EPR vs coherent beams
If Alice uses EPR beams (or modulates a maximally
squeezed beam), s = 1/V , but Alice and Bob have infor-
mation only every second transmission, since they don’t
always choose the same measurement basis.
∆IEPR =
1
4
log2
1(
Gχ+ G
V
)2 = 12 log2
1
Gχ+ G
V
(54)
If the added noise only comes from losses, G ≤ 1 and
Gχ = 1−G. In that case equation (54) becomes
∆IEPR,losses =
1
2
log2
1
1−G(1− 1
V
)
≥ 0 (55)
For coherent beams, no squeezing is used, therefore
s = 1 and the mutual informations are not dependent of
the basis choice. We have thus
∆Icoh =
1
2
log2
1(
Gχ+G 1
V
)
(Gχ+G)
(56)
∆Icoh = ∆IEPR − 1
2
log2G(1 + χ) (57)
Since Gχ ≥ (1 − G), with the equality iff the noise is
minimal and G ≤ 1, we obtain
∆Icoh ≤ ∆IEPR, (58)
both secret rates being equal if and only if the noise comes
only from losses. As in [1], squeezing does not improve
the secret rate for losses only, but this is no more true in
presence of excess noise.
B. Strong losses
Assuming strong losses, G≪ 1, no excess noise, and a
large initial modulation, eqs. 55 and 57 become
∆IEPR,losses = ∆Icoh,losses ≃ G
2 ln 2
. (59)
This secret rate can be compared with BB84’s rate, which
is 1
2
Gn¯, with n¯ = 1 for single photons and n¯ ≪ 1 for
weak coherent pulses. Even if BB84 uses two modes of
the electromagnetic field, it is slightly less efficient than
our reversed continuous variable protocols, but the order
of magnitude is the same (for strong losses).
Taking for instance a 100 km line with 20 dB loss
(G = 0.01) and a reasonable modulation (V ≃ 10), the
secret key rate is 6.5 ·10−3 bit/symbol. For the same pa-
rameters, the secret key rate for QDV QKD with an ideal
single photon source would be at best 5 · 10−3 bit/time
slot, and would be one order of magnitude smaller us-
ing attenuated light pulses with n¯ = 0.1, even with per-
fect detectors. Actually it is zero with state-of-the-art
QDV systems at 1550 nm. It is also noticeable that with
a “symbol rate” of a few MHz that should be easy to
achieve, the QCV secret key rate after 100 km is more
than 10 kbits/sec, while it is simply zero for QDV.
More realistically, one should take into account possi-
ble excess noise in the line. Defining the excess noise as
ǫ = χ− (1−G)/G, it is simple to show that the reverse
protocols are secure as long as as ǫ < (V −1)/(2V ) ∼ 1/2
for coherent states, and ǫ < (V − 1)/V ∼ 1 for EPR
beams. This shows again that it is possible to use coher-
ent states, though EPR beams are more robust indeed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that reverse reconciliation
protocols can be used to extract a secret key from the
exchange of coherent, squeezed or EPR beams between
Alice and Bob. The key is secure against individual at-
tacks for any transmission of the optical line between Al-
ice and Bob, provided that the excess noise (noise beyond
the loss-induced vacuum noise) is not too large.
Squeezing makes these protocols more robust against
the excess noise, but it is not absolutely required. It can
be shown [6] that reverse reconciliation is optimum for
a coherent states protocol with no excess noise in the
transmission line, but this is not always the case : for
instance, direct reconciliation may be better for high line
transmission and large excess noise. It may therefore be
possible to optimize further the secret bit rate by using
two-ways reconciliation protocols.
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